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Abstract
The purpose of this exploratory study was to identify the analytic frames children (ages 9 to 11)
employed as they worked together to make sense of an ill-structured problem, what those same children did when their frames collided in the context of deliberative dialogue, and what they learned
from the process of negotiation. Data included pre-and post-dialogue interviews with individual
children as well as videotapes of the five dialogue sessions. Analysis suggests that children invoked six
frames: fairness, common good, safety, kindness, tradition and self-interest. Of these, fairness and common good were super-ordinate frames, which resonated with peers and facilitated the building of consensus. Groups in which children demonstrated greater willingness to engage others’ ideas made the
most gains in their ability to employ multiple frames from pre-to post-task interviews. Findings suggest a need for explicit instruction about the sociocultural contexts delimiting individuals’ framing of
complex problems. Such instruction has the potential to grow students’ civic capabilities as critical
consumers of public discourse who can listen across difference and participate productively in shared
decision making.
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our fourth graders are gathered around a table.
They are tasked with making a collective decision
about how to spend a sum of money allotted for
playground improvements. The PTA has given them five choices.
They can purchase a sunshade, a swing set, playground balls for all
classes, or Hula-Hoops and jump ropes for all classes, or they can
give the money to the pre-K children to spend on their playground.
Oliver, Cody, and Adam each announce their preference: sunshade,
pre-K, sunshade, respectively. Addie offers hers: “We should give
the money to pre-K because they don’t have as much stuff as we do.
So that’s my first choice.” Something about her use of the word
should gives the group pause. Cody then states, “Say ‘aye’ if you
want the pre-K playground.” Oliver and Adam look at one another,
clearly taken by surprise. “What?” Adam says, “I wanted sunshade.”
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“Me too,” says Oliver. To which Cody responds, “Well, then, state
your defense.”
“What defense?” asks Adam.
“Your defense to keep your honor,” responds Cody.
“What?!”
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“I can go first,” offers Oliver.
“Okay, state your defense,” directs Cody again.
“Well, I’m thinking we can get the sunshade for the big
playground because we all like running around mostly, and we get
hot . . . and the pre-K-ers mostly play ball, like they throw the balls
and they ride their bikes.”
Addie adds, “They have tricycles.”
“Yeah, they ride the bike, the little tricycle bike, and we run
around. And we like running around, and we get hotter, but they
just like riding bikes,” Oliver continues.
“I know. I didn’t think about that. And they have chalk and they
have the blacktop,” Addie adds again.

What makes ill-structured problems ill-structured is that they
not only lack a clear “best” solution but they lack a definitive “best”
way of framing the problem so that one might determine a best
solution (Kuhn, 2015). In this brief excerpt, the three boys begin
the dialogue by stating their personal preferences. Addie shifts the
conversation by framing the problem normatively: in terms of
what the group should do according to some abstract sense of right
and wrong. This new framing comes with some power. Immediately one of the boys calls for a vote in favor of Addie’s proposed
solution and, when he is challenged, demands that the challenger
“state his defense.” In defending his side, Oliver seems to feel that
not only must he justify his preference for the sunshade but he must
simultaneously refute Addie’s assertion that spending money on
themselves would not be the right thing to do. He explains that the
pre-K children mostly play ball and ride bikes—toys they already
have—and that the older children have greater need for new
equipment. He seemingly accepts Addie’s concern for fairness as a
legitimate one but rejects it as an acceptable frame for this particular problem. In lieu of a fairness frame, he speaks on behalf of all
other big kids, asserting that it is in their common interest to
purchase a sunshade.
Most research on children’s argumentation has focused on
interventions that may grow the sophistication of their arguments
(often in writing). In particular, interventions are typically aimed
at increasing children’s use of evidence to support claims and their
ability to engage both sides of a debate. Such studies suggest that
young children are less likely to offer dual or integrative arguments
or to understand the significance of evidence for argument
development (Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Crowell,
2011; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Pontecorvo and Giradet (1993) went so
far as to report that nine-year-olds offer one-sided (personal)
arguments over 80% of the time. This may be because, developmentally, it has been argued, children are just growing their
perspective-taking ability about this time (Flavell, 2004). While
such work is helpful in shedding light on children’s ability to
construct and articulate a sound argument, it rarely unpacks
children’s reasoning about ill-structured problems along the way.
And, as Kuhn and Udell (2003) asserted, much less attention has
been paid to the process of children’s argumentative discourse than
to the constructions of their individual arguments.
An exception to this trend is work by Zhang and colleagues
(2013), which suggested that even young children apply a variety of
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analytic frames as they make sense of complex problems and that
these frames can be understood as culturally relevant. In their
study of Chinese and American children’s reasoning about a moral
dilemma in the book The Pinewood Derby (McNurlen, 1998), these
scholars found that Chinese students were more likely to demonstrate altruistic tendencies in their framing of the problem, calling
on principles of honesty, empathy, and friendship (common values
in collectivist cultures) while American children were more likely
to express egocentric concerns such as personal consequences for
doing the “right” thing. After participating in a series of dialogue
sessions, however, all children demonstrated increased willingness
to consider new ways of framing the problem (suggesting that
development is not the only factor in explaining children’s growing
perspective taking ability).
Much more research is needed, however, that strives
to understand the nature of children’s arguments as they represent
understandings they have about the world. How do children frame
the problem? What general principles or perspectives contribute to
that framing? What happens when children’s frames collide in
dialogue? Furthermore, much remains to be discovered about
children’s process as they collectively negotiate among analytic
frames for a given problem, and how their experience may
facilitate differing learning outcomes. Such insights would provide
a foundation from which to make informed pedagogical and
policy decisions with regards to elementary civic education. In this
article, I describe the analytic frames children (ages 9–11)
employed to make sense of the ill-structured problem described
above, as well as what those same children did when their frames
collided in the context of deliberative dialogue, and what they
learned from the process of negotiation.

Deliberative Dialogue
Unlike other forms of discussion, deliberation has as its aim
“deciding on a plan of action that will resolve a shared problem . . .
The opening question is usually some version of, ‘What should we
do about this?” (Parker, 2003, p. 131). “Generally speaking, deliberation processes engage people in discussion with others about
public issues that are controversial but require collective decision
making and action” (Carretero, Haste, & Bermudez, 2016, p. 302).
Though deliberation leads, at best, to a provisional resolution, it
nonetheless requires consensus among members of a group on
what to do now given what we know.
Deliberative discussion is grounded in a participatory
conception of democracy and a belief that effective citizens
demonstrate “a variety of social capacities for working with
others . . . to influence public and civic life by building coalitions,
seeking consensus, negotiating differences, and managing conflict”
(Carretero, Haste, & Bermudez, 2016, p. 297). As Gutmann and
Thompson (2004) argued, deliberative democracy is a form of
government
. . . in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are
mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching
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conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to
challenge in the future. (p. 7)

Ideally, deliberative dialogue is characterized by mutuality
and approached with humility and caution. It requires that one
grant others epistemic privilege and acknowledge the ever-present
possibility that one may be wrong (Parker, 2003). “Talk thus breaks
through the walls of the private world of family, friends and
neighbors and ordains concourse with strangers in a larger
artificial world of political citizenship” (Barber, 2003, p. 189).
Humility means acknowledging that one’s “knowledge and
experience are limited and incomplete” (Barber, 2003, p. 12). This
acknowledgment requires that one enter and navigate interactions
with caution. Parker (2003) wrote, “If I am cautious when listening
and responding, I will engage carefully so that I am not denying or
dismissing the validity of the insider’s point of view, nor even
appearing to do so” (p. 93). The democratic concept of mutuality
recognizes the inevitability of one’s self being part of an authentic
civic relationship. Humility and caution are necessary only because
we cannot ever truly escape the private spaces we inhabit and the
ways they shape our knowing. Competent participation in a civic
space, then, involves
listening as well as talking, striving to understand points of view
different from one’s own, challenging ideas and proposals rather than
persons, admitting ignorance, slowing the rush to decision so as to
clarify or reframe the problem or gather more information . . . even
appreciating the principle attributed to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” (Parker,
2003, pp. 87–88)

Barber (2003) asserted:
“I will listen” means . . . I will put myself in his place, I will try to
understand, I will strain to hear what makes us alike, I will listen for a
common rhetoric evocative of a common purpose or a common good.
(p. 175)

Phillips (2004), in discussion with “a fellowship of six
students,” three Jewish and three Arab, found a powerful example
of such listening. Iyad, an Arab student, says of his evolving
friendship with his Jewish colleagues:
We did start to speak, but carefully, still saying what we felt we had to
say, but also being sensitive to the other’s feelings. And we listened
carefully to each other’s responses. We realized we had similar
concerns and hopes—to live free of fear, to have security for our
families, to have some control over our lives, our futures.

Dorothy, a Jewish member of the group, agreed:
Instead of trying to win an argument, we voiced our concerns, but also
we really opened ourselves up to the concerns of the other. . . . Because
once you recognize how legitimate each other’s concerns are, then I
think you have to go the next step and address them. (pp. 165–166)

As seen here, a disposition toward active and authentic communication enables the sort of mutuality necessary for the “creative
resolution of conflict” (Hunt & Metcalf, 1955/1996). Mutuality in
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civic dialogue, then, involves negotiation through collaborative,
empathic processes (Selman, 1980), integration of the needs of self
and other (Gilligan, 1982), and authenticity (Siddle Walker &
Snarey, 2004). It is not just talking and listening, per se, that
matter—rather, talking and listening with humility, in an effort to
understand the other, sensitive to her feelings, and in search of
common ground. Such skills are particularly important within the
context of civic deliberation, where it is not enough to simply
“agree to disagree.”
To this end, it would seem, “schools ought to teach students to
share their reasoning with each other, to listen to competing points
of view, to consider new evidence, and to treat each other as
political equals” (McAvoy & Hess, 2013, p. 19). Effective teachers,
however, are hamstrung if they know little about how their
students learn, what emerging competencies look like, and what
instructional methods facilitate growth. Thus, it was not my
intention to evaluate the degree to which children’s engagement
matched this deliberative ideal; rather, I sought to understand
children’s thought and action within the deliberative context
established.

Sociocultural Theories of Communication
Communication is the process of producing and negotiating
meanings and is always culturally situated (Schirato & Yell, 2000).
The deliberative dialogue sessions described here, for instance,
were particular contexts in which children with unique backgrounds talked together. But their encounters were nested within
larger contexts. And children’s understandings of those larger
contexts shaped how they approached and engaged in the dialogue
(James, Kobe, & Zhao, 2017). Children had prior knowledge of the
school, for example, as a social milieu—of normative behavioral
expectations, of what counted as knowledge, of their positions relative to others in this space. They had experience of the classroom, in
so far as it had been a space where they came to know their peers.
Intersecting with these fairly immediate contexts were the milieus
where children spent time outside of school—families and
communities. In each of these spaces, children consistently
received messages about what was valued, expected, understood to
be right or good or true—messages that informed the solutions
to the problem they generated.
Whether consciously or subconsciously, children (like
adults) are always in the process of reading the spaces they
encounter. Such reading involves asking What is expected here?
What is appropriate? How will I be perceived or positioned by
others? and is necessarily shaped by our cultural and sociocultural
understandings. Examples of cultural understandings include
shared conceptions of masculinity and femininity (Hofstede,
1991), understandings about a “good life” or moral good (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), and general norms and practices of a
culture that codify acceptable behavior. Cultural understandings
are, of course, experienced and understood by individuals and
groups differently; they are not monolithic. Nonetheless, these
understandings represent generally accepted (and typically
dominant) ways of being and thinking. Sociocultural understandings emerge from the groups of which we are a part. Some of these
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groups we choose (service groups, occupational groups, political
parties). Others, we are born into (racial and ethnic groups,
families, age groups, gender groups). These groups “enforce sets
of expected behaviors (norms and rules) and have shared values”
that influence our communication with others (Gudykunst &
Kim, 2003, p. 47). The process of reading and rereading spaces
allows us to acquire a “practical sense,” or the ability to make our
utterances relevant or appropriate in the spaces where we spend
time (Bourdieu, 1991).
The utterances we make, then, are the result of the relation
between our linguistic habitus (our reading of the space) and the
specific linguistic field, or market,1 in which we find ourselves
(Bourdieu, 1991). Each context is a market, in that resources
(different kinds of capital) are distributed and exchanged. One’s
accent, for example, or command of local dialect, and social status
are all forms of capital that contribute to an individual’s relative
power in a linguistic market. Because markets are not all the same,
our power, our status relative to others, our ability to effect change,
also vary from context to context. A speaker’s sense or expectation
of the value that linguistic practices will have in different markets is
thus also part of his or her linguistic habitus.
As applied here, sociocultural theories of communication
allow us to see children’s analytic frames as reflective of their own
cultural positions. The negotiation of children’s analytic frames is
also a culturally situated process of meaning making where some
frames likely have more capital than others. Borrowing from the
field of political science (and, admittedly, research conducted
with adults), I use the term resonant to describe those analytic
frames that carry greater power in a particular dialogic space
(Desrosiers, 2007; Martin, 2015; Rojecki, 2007; Woodly,
2007). Desrosiers (2007) explained:
When filtered through common identity referents, the language, the
images and ideas [called] upon are so close to what individuals know,
so consistent with their social reality that they can seem
commonsensical, justifiable and fitting. These collective referents are
reinterpreted, not invented–but by being historically or normatively
grounded in a common cultural stock, when used to build appeals,
they can help achieve greater resonance and in parallel crystallise
sentiments of group attachment to foster solidarity and justify
collective action. (p. 2)

Put simply, ideas have resonance when they strike participants as
being more intelligible or persuasive than others. Savvy participants may even tap into highly resonant ideas, or what Poggi
(2005) called “super-ordinate goals,” in order to gain traction for
their own particular subordinate goals. It is safe to say that young
children will relate to dialogue and reason about ill-structured
problems differently than adults do. Understanding these differences was the subject of this inquiry. Specifically, research questions included:
1. What analytic frames do children deploy in this deliberative dialogue session?
2. How do children negotiate differing analytic frames in
the context of deliberative dialogue?
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3. Which analytic frameworks have the most resonance?
Why?
4. How does participation in the deliberative dialogue
contribute to changes in how individual children frame
the problem from pre-to post-interview?

Methods
Findings reported here are part of a larger two-year design-based
research study2 in which a team of researchers sought to understand relationships between young children’s thought and action
across four civic spaces: deliberative dialogue sessions, bystander
dilemmas, collaborative inquiry, and group discussion. Here, I focus
explicitly on children’s participation in deliberative dialogue
sessions. The design of these tasks provided rich opportunities to
access children’s thought and action at both an individual and a
group level.

Community, School, and Classroom
Cobb Elementary School is located in the Southeast United States.
The student body at Cobb Elementary is made up of approximately
500 children, 39% of whom are African American, 7% Asian, 5%
Hispanic, 46% White, and 3% multiracial (self-identified). Students
hail from 30 states and 23 countries. Cobb is seated in a city with
one of the highest poverty rates in the nation (nearly 40%).
Sixty-five percent of students receive free or reduced lunch.
The focus classroom consisted of 20 fourth graders, ages 9–11.
This age group was selected because we understand the period
between ages 7 and 10 to be critical for growth in communication
skills (McDevitt, Spivey, Sheehan, Lennon, & Story, 1990). Children in this age span are said to grow increasingly capable of
monitoring their speech from another’s perspective and consider
the perspectives of others (Flavell, 2004) and to be experiencing a
reduction in egocentrism and a greater ability to acknowledge and
understand the motives and intentions of others (Piaget, 1950;
Wadsworth, 2003). Because research suggests that this process
begins earlier for girls, due to their tendency for attachment
(Gilligan, 1982), and among African American students (roughly
40% of the students with whom we worked) (Siddle Walker &
Snarey, 2004), we hoped that students in this class would demonstrate a range of civic performances and understandings. Detailed
demographic data about the children whose families consented for
them to participate is included in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Student Participant Demographics
Pseudonym Race

Socioeconomic Status

Gender

Anna

Multiracial

Economically
disadvantaged

Female

Adam

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Male

Addie

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Female

Brittany

African American

Not reported

Female
(continued)
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Table 1. Student Participant Demographics (continued)

community were having. Their new school still required a number
of finishing touches, including outside areas for playing and
gathering. Children often discussed their desire for more playground equipment and shady areas to escape the intensity of the
sun. Adults, including family members, teachers, administrators
and other school personnel, frequently participated in similar
conversations. As this task was being presented to the children,
members of the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) were engaged
in discussions about what equipment to purchase next. We
explained to the children that the results of their peer deliberations
would be shared with the PTA. We introduced the task to the
students by explaining the situation to them. The task read as
follows:

Pseudonym Race

Socioeconomic Status

Gender

Caleb

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Male

Cody

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Male

Curtis

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Male

Daniel

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Male

Dominic

African American

Not reported

Male

David

White

Economically
disadvantaged

Male

Eddie

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Male

Helen

Asian American

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Female

Joshua

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Male

Jacob

African American

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Male

Mary

White

Economically
disadvantaged

Female

Maggie

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Female

Oliver

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Male

Figure 1. Playground task.

Paula

White/Hispanic

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Female

Rachel

White

Noneconomically
disadvantaged

Female

Taylor

African American

Economically
disadvantaged

Female

The task was bounded by the five choices, which members of
the PTA were indeed considering. This enabled us to see how
individuals and groups of children reasoned about and selected
among those choices. The closed nature of the task also enabled us
to see whether or not the children thought beyond the task’s
parameters. The task also challenged the students to think about
whose interests were being served by the different options presented and to decide which considerations were most important to
make.

Deliberative Dialogue Session: Playground Equipment
Deliberative dialogue, defined here as the process of collaboratively
arriving at a decision about a problem by comparing, contrasting,
and evaluating alternatives (Asterhan & Babichenko, 2015), has been
shown to incite more effective participation than those in which
students are expected to persuade others or simply engage in open
discussion (Garcia-Mila, Gilabert, Erduran & Felton, 2013; Schwarz,
1995). Deliberative dialogue sessions are particularly generative
when they engage students in shared reasoning about an ill-
structured problem—one that challenges students to apply various
analytic frames in an effort to weigh better and worse solutions, but
is open ended in that different frameworks may yield different “best”
answers (Adey & Shayer, 1990; Asterhan & Schwarz, 2009; Kuhn,
2015). Drawing on the literature, we crafted a task that was authentic
and ill-structured and required students to strive for consensus.
The topic for this deliberative dialogue session was grounded
in real conversations members of the Cobb Elementary School
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

Your grade level has been given some money to buy more
playground equipment.
You have five options:

• You could buy a sunshade for your playground.
• You could buy a swing set for your playground.
• You could buy a set of playground balls for your class to
use.
• You could buy a set of jump ropes and Hula-Hoops for
your class to use.
• You could give the money to the preK students so they
can buy playground equipment.
Think about all of the choices. Decide which choice is best. How
would you spend the money?

Data Collection
Data collection included individual pre-and post-task interviews
with each child and videotapes of groups of children as they
deliberated. During the pre-task interview, the researcher read the
task to the child and offered an image of each playground improvement option in order to make the task less abstract. The child was
given some time to think about the problem. After the child
decided which choice s/he felt was best, the researcher asked the
child a series of questions to learn more about his/her decision as
well as how the child was thinking about the discussion s/he was
about to have. Each child was asked to discuss how s/he conceptualized the problem and to predict how his/her group discussion
would unfold. (See Appendix A: Pre-Task Interview Protocol.)
After each of the individual pre-task interviews was completed, group members were brought together and read the task.
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The researchers provided the children with images of the five
choices and a group recording sheet. They were given approximately 20 minutes to discuss the issue and decide how the money
should be spent. The group discussion sessions were video-
recorded from two different angles. This allowed us to see how the
children were engaging with one another, performing in both
verbal and nonverbal ways, and enacting (or changing) their
self-described stances. We used tabletop microphones in order to
improve the quality of the audio.
After the discussion session concluded, each of the
children was again interviewed by a researcher. The post-task
interview was designed to elicit the students’ interpretation of
their group’s discussion and decision. They were asked to
evaluate the nature and quality of their discussion by describing
how the conversation went and how they felt about the outcome
of their conversation. Both the pre-and post-task interviews
were videotaped (audio-taped on rare occasions when we ran
into technical difficulties). (See Appendix B: Post-Task Interview Protocol.)

Data Analysis

Establishing codes. Zhang and colleagues (2013) identified nine
moral principles from which children drew in their reflective
essays: honesty, fairness, empathy, friendship, promise, trust,
golden rule, common good, don’t tattle. These they identified a
priori (through careful reading of the text to which children would
respond) and checked against an initial reading of children’s essays.
A robust example of research on young children’s analytic frames
(and one of the only examples), this work offered a useful place to
begin. I followed much the same process in generating codes for
analytic frames. Because I was present when data was collected, I
had an idea of the frames children had employed individually and
in dialogue. I generated a list of frames based on my understanding
of the ill-structured problem and my experience while watching
children participate in the task. I generated five codes: fairness,
kindness, safety, common good, and self-interest. After careful
reading of the pre-task and post-task interviews and video
transcripts, I added a sixth code: tradition.
I then invited four research assistants to read one complete
data set (pre-and post-task interviews and video transcript for one
group), openly coding for analytic frames. We met as a group to
discuss their codes, and despite the assistants’ having given the
codes slightly different names (being nice for kindness and personal
gain for self-interest), their collective list was the same as my own.
From here, I went on to code each pre-task and post-task interview
as well as video transcript. I sought first to describe how often each
of the six analytic frames was invoked within each group’s dialogue.
Based on my reading of Zhang et al.’s (2013) work, I hypothesized
that fairness may be a prominent frame.
Identifying opportunities for negotiation. Because I was
interested in understanding what happens when children’s
differing analytic frames collide in dialogue, I then revisited the
videotape transcripts to identify “opportunities for negotiation.”
These I defined as occurrences when analytic frames were offered
by children. I wished to understand what happened when a frame
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

was offered. Did other children agree with the speaker’s framing?
Reject it? Ignore it? In this second layer of analysis, I coded each
conversational turn following the identified “opportunity
for negotiation” with the following: A (asserted), I (ignored),
C (contested) or E (echoed). Coding stopped when the negotiation
of a particular frame ended.
The following is an example of a group’s negotiation of an
analytic frame (safety):
Addie: You know how they told us not to be sliding down
those other poles? People might slide down these poles
[of the sunshade] and they might fall. (Safety-A)
Oliver: But they won’t be able to get on them. (Safety-C)
Adam: Yeah, they’re vertical with a top. They’re straight up
and down. (Safety-C)
Cody: Curiosity is, someone might run into the poles.
(Safety-E)
Addie: Yeah, people can run into the poles when they’re
running . . . (Safety-E)
Oliver: They might run into y’all’s poles. But people, well
people are supposed to look in front and look to see
where they’re going . . . I haven’t seen anybody hit a pole
on their face or anything before. (Safety-C)
Cody: It would be nice to have a tree house, wouldn’t it?
In this example, Addie and Cody offered up safety concerns as
a way of framing the problem to determine a best solution. Oliver
and Adam contested this framing, first by saying that children can’t
climb the poles and then explaining that it’s unlikely anyone would
run into the poles. Seemingly convinced, Cody shifted the conversation to talk about his wish for a tree house and safety was not
brought up again.
Contrarily, the following is an example of an analytic frame
being echoed once it is introduced. After her group had collectively
dismissed both safety and fairness as acceptable ways to frame the
problem, Helen asked, “Well then why do you think it’s good to
have a sunshade?”
Taylor: Because when it’s really hot outside, we can sit in the
shade. (Common good-A)
Dominic: Yeah, or when some kids are playing, they can be in
the shade. (Common good-E)
Joshua: Yeah, some people like to walk around where they
won’t be bothered by the hot sun. Plus the sun isn’t
shining in your eyes. (Common good-E)
Joshua: It’s also a built-in umbrella, so everyone can go
outside while it’s raining. (Common good-E)
In this example, the group found a way of framing
the problem on which they can all agree. In response to Helen’s
prompting, the other three children suggested that the sunshade
was good for “we,” “some kids,” “some people,” and “everyone.”
They argued that the sunshade was the best solution because so
many people would benefit from it—those who wanted to sit, play,
or walk in the shade, those who didn’t like sun in their eyes, or
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disliked feeling hot, even those who wanted to play outside when
it’s raining. Once this framing was offered, it gained momentum,
resonating with other members of the group. They felt comfortable
making their decision because they agreed that it would do the
most good for the most people.
Upon completing this second layer of analysis, I wrote thick
narrative descriptions for each group’s performance in dialogue
that sought to answer the questions: Which frames are in play?
Which ones seem to resonate? How do children weigh the relative
power of differing frames? Some frames were easily and often
contested, such as those appealing to self-interest. Others seemed
to present children with a challenge. They felt they needed to
resolve the issue a frame posed or to choose the particular
solution the frame was used to justify. As predicted, fairness was
one of these more challenging frames with which children felt
compelled to wrestle. Common good was another. The latter
examples I identified as super-ordinate (Poggi, 2005) analytic
frames—ones that resonated the most with the greatest number
of children.
Documenting shifts in thinking. The final step of the analysis
involved revisiting the interview transcripts to see what changes, if
any, were evident in children’s framing of the problem from pre-to
post-task. I was specifically interested in seeing what frames
students employed in their post-task interview that they hadn’t
before, and how they might explain any shifts in their thinking. I
began by recording all of the frames offered by children in their
pre-task interviews as potential ways of thinking about the
problem (ones that they or others might offer). I then did the same
with the post-task interviews, noting any new frames that children
offered. Finally, I recorded which children brought which frames
to the dialogue in order to look for patterns (in quantity and by
demographic group).

Results
Children’s analytic frames
Across the three data sources (pre-task interviews, video-taped
dialogue sessions, post-task interviews), children employed six
analytic frames: fairness, kindness, safety, common good, self-
interest, and tradition. I describe each below.
Fairness. Especially when children argued in favor of giving
the money to the pre-k kids, children framed the problem as a
question of fairness. For the most part, fairness was understood as
a matter of equality. Maggie said, “They don’t have a lot of stuff like
we do.” Helen said, “Yeah, they have nothing to do.” Often, these
arguments included comparisons made through numbers. “We
have two rocks, a spider web and a climbing thing. They have only
one thing to climb on.” Counter arguments that also invoked
fairness as a frame included “They have bikes and bouncy balls”
and “They have more equipment than we do. We have only
structures.”
Common good. An oft-invoked frame was that of common
good. Typically, children’s framing of the problem as an issue of
common good meant that they thought one solution to be better
than another because more people would like it or benefit from it.
Sometimes these arguments were fairly utilitarian: “There are only
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about 30 pre-K-ers, and there are at least 160 kids in fourth and
fifth grade, so we should keep the money.” More often, common
good arguments highlighted the ways different groups of children
would benefit from the decision. Dominic said, “We all get hot. I
think other kids will like it.” Taylor added, “Some people like to sit
in the shade, some like to run around. This way we have choices.”
Conner said, “I’ve heard a lot of people say they want a swing set.”
Safety. Many children framed the problem as one of safety,
saying such things as “The poles might be dangerous . . . People
could run into them”; “People could get hit by the balls. It’s not
safe”; “Someone might get hit in the head”; and “If it’s too sunny, we
can’t see, and we might run into people and get hurt.”
Kindness. Children who framed the problem as an issue of
kindness offered such arguments as “I think we should be generous,” “It would be nice for them,” “They might even write a song for
us to thank us,” and “They’d be so happy!” Contrarily, counter
arguments were offered such as “If we don’t give it to them, they’d
be sad.”
Self-interest. At some point in each conversation, at least one
child talked about his or her personal preference, framing the
problem as one of self-interest. Mary said, “They’re fun to play
with. I like this one.” David offered, “I’d rather be hot than cold, so I
pick sunshade.” Later he said, “I pick me. And I’m sunshade.”
Sometimes children couched their arguments in shared self-
interest. David said, “We should have greatness before we leave
elementary school.” Cody said, “The sunshade will take too long to
build. By the time it’s up, we’ll be in middle school.”
Tradition. Occasionally, children framed the problem as one
of tradition. They suggested that because they used to have one of
the playground options (usually the swing set), they should again.
Curtis said, “We had that at our old school. So we should have one
here.”
Though the frames are described here as distinct, they often
overlapped in interesting and complex ways. Self-interest was
sometimes oriented toward “we,” suggesting that the speaker
hoped to tap into others’ personal interest and find some common
ground. If other children didn’t share the speaker’s interest,
however, the contribution was dismissed as selfish or irrelevant.
Safety too had an element of common good—students who offered
safety as a frame seemed to be suggesting that it was in everyone’s
best interest to choose one thing or another because everyone
would be safer. Interestingly, children almost always determined
that safety was not a reasonable framing of the problem because
the safety concerns raised were not likely to be experienced by the
majority of children. As I explain in the next section, common
good and fairness played particularly powerful roles in dialogue.
The ability of individual children to connect safety, kindness,
tradition or their own self-interest to concerns about fairness
or common good mattered. For this reason, I consider fairness and
common good to be what Poggi (2005) called “super-ordinate”
frames, and the others, “subordinate.”

Negotiating Analytic Frames
Table 2 represents the number of times a particular frame was
engaged in some way during children’s deliberation. The first
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column includes the total number of conversational turns in which
children attended to the frame overall. This includes the number of
times the frame was asserted, echoed, and contested. From this
chart, it is clear that fairness and common good were the most often
engaged frames. Fairness occupied 72 conversational turns.
Though it was only asserted eight times, children contested it 53
times. Common good occupied 51 conversational turns. It was
asserted 36 times and contested thrice. That these two frames were
so prevalent in conversation yet treated so differently by children is
significant, and I return to it in the next section.
Table 2. Negotiating Analytic Frames Overall (Frequencies)
Analytic
Frame

Conversational Asserted Ignored Agreed Contested
Turns

Fairness

72

8

0

11

53

Common
Good

51

36

(3)

12

3

Safety

26

12

(4)

5

9

Kindness

21

10

(6)

0

11

Self-Interest

9

8

(7)

0

1

Tradition

1

1

(1)

0

0

Self-interest and tradition were the least often engaged frames.
They were neither asserted very often, nor were they taken up by
peers. It could be that children didn’t believe these frames would
resonate with their peers, and so they didn’t offer them very often.
It might also be that children learned this along the way. When
these frames were offered during dialogue, they were almost always
ignored by the other children. Failing to have others pick up on
their offering, children dropped these frames.
Kindness and safety, though asserted fairly frequently, were
just as often contested. This suggests that children found these
frames worthy of some consideration, but not the best frames for
the problem at hand. Often, children’s kindness assertions were
ignored. If they were taken up, they were met with explanations
about how the young children’s feelings wouldn’t actually be hurt
because the fourth graders are nice to them in other ways and they
have other things to make them happy. Safety concerns were
typically dismissed as unlikely, and so dropped. Taken together, we
could say that these frames had some resonance—children seem to
believe that being kind and safe are important considerations—but
that in deciding this particular issue, kindness and safety were not
the most pressing concerns.
In what follows, I offer a description of how deliberations
unfolded within the five groups and the critical role fairness and
common good played in each.

Fairness as a Super-Ordinate Frame
Findings suggest that children called on a number of analytic
frames to make sense of the problem before them. When
those frames collided in deliberative dialogue, some frames gained
traction, resonating across the group, while others faded to the
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

background. Among the analytic frames offered by children,
fairness was a super-ordinate analytic frame—one that had
resonating power with all children.
Once deliberation was under way, each group first wrestled
with whether or not it was right to keep the money or give the
money to the pre-K children to spend. Fairness was the analytic
frame invoked most often during these initial parts of the deliberation. Four of the five groups resolved this issue of fairness, and
three did so rather quickly. In Group One, despite having been the
one to assert that giving the money to the pre-K children would
be the fair thing to do, Addie was quick to abandon her position
once Oliver asserted that the pre-K children had more equipment
than the older kids. She said, “I didn’t think about that. And they
have chalk and they have a black top.” Adam echoed this, saying,
“They have like balls and stuff.” Back and forth the group went,
naming all of the specific equipment and activities the pre-K
children already enjoyed. Once they agreed that fairness was not an
issue, meaning they could keep the money for themselves, they
shifted gears to consider other possible solutions.
In Group Two, Dominic started by saying that the pre-K
children didn’t have much stuff to play with, and Helen agreed.
Joshua confidently responded, “They have a lot of running space.
I’ll tell you that right now.” Helen inserted, “I don’t think you guys
like that idea.” And Joshua said, “Nope.” Fairness did not come up
again.
Group Five also quickly put the pre-K question aside. Paula
offered, “They have a lot of stuff already,” and the rest of the group
agreed. They didn’t return to pre-K as a viable solution to the
problem nor to fairness as a frame.
In Group Three, the issue of fairness was not so quickly put
to rest. It came up in the first minute of the conversation when
Jacob said, “Pre-K doesn’t have anything to play with.” The
dialogue continued and children considered other possible
solutions. Throughout the course of the dialogue, Conner
interrupted by reminding his peers that they weren’t being
particularly fair or kind. He said, “So we eliminated pre-K
because you guys are heartless people who don’t care about little
kids.” Later he said, “I thought you were good-hearted people, but
apparently I was wrong.” Each time Conner offered these
critiques, the group banded together to refute his accusations
that they are unfair or unkind. They repeatedly told him that
“they have lots of stuff,” that “there aren’t as many kids in pre-K,”
and “they’ll get to use the sunshade when they’re older.” Eventually, Conner seemed satisfied and the group moved on to consider other solutions.
Group Four also wrestled with the question of fairness. Unlike
the other groups, however, they were unable to resolve it. The
dialogue began with three of four children in favor of the sunshade.
The most vocal sunshade proponent consistently argued for his
own self-interest throughout the course of the deliberation.
Contrarily, the original proponent of giving the money to the pre-k
children consistently framed the problem as one of fairness.
Eventually, the balance switched and three of four children opted
for giving the money to pre-K, each offering a variety of kindness
and fairness arguments. The one remaining proponent for
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sunshade was unable to persuade his peers. His self-interest frame
did not resonate like the fairness one did. In the end, the group
failed to reach consensus.

Common Good . . . or Nothing
What happened once the fairness question was put to rest within a
group? Then children were left to look for another super-ordinate
analytic frame that would pull them together and help them sort
among the choices. In three groups, once fairness was addressed,
common good rose to the top as a super-ordinate analytic frame. In
Group Two, for instance, children worked together to build a
common good case, identifying more and more populations
within the school who would benefit from the sunshade. In the
third group, children justified their choice of the sunshade by
saying that more children would benefit today from their choice
and eventually the pre-K children would get to partake as well. And
in Group Five, the group quickly decided on the sunshade by
articulating how all children get hot and would enjoy the shade.
Group Four, because they could not resolve the fairness
problem, never got to the point of looking for a second super-
ordinate frame. Fairness trumped the dialogue and they worked
right up to the end of their time trying to address it.
In the first group, the children did resolve the fairness
question, but then struggled to find another super-ordinate frame
that resonated with all members. Individual children offered lots of
frames—safety, common good, self-interest—but none resonated
across the group. Each was quickly refuted. Left without one, they
resorted to standing in their respective positions arguing for their
own self-interest. At the end, no decision was reached.
Table 3 represents the super-ordinate frames employed by
groups to reach consensus. All groups began by working through
the problem as a question of fairness. Four groups resolved the
fairness question. Of these, three went on to employ common good
as an organizing frame. Group One, though they resolved the
fairness question, could not then identify another analytic frame
that resonated across the group. And Group Four never was able to
resolve the fairness question. Thus, in the end, only the three
groups that resolved fairness and shifted to common good as a
second super-ordinate frame were able to reach consensus.
Table 3. Super-Ordinate Analytic Frames Employed by Group
Group

Initial Super-Ordinate
Frame

Second Super-
Ordinate Frame

Consensus

One

Fairness

None

No

Two

Fairness

Common good

Yes

Three

Fairness

Common good

Yes

Four

Fairness

Can’t resolve fairness

No

Five

Fairness

Common good

Yes

What Children Learn
Did individual children’s understanding of the problem shift as a
result of their participation in the deliberative dialogue? If so, how?
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

As represented in table 4, 11 out of 20 children demonstrated
understanding of at least one additional frame during their
post-task interview than they had before the dialogue.
Interestingly, these gains were not evenly distributed across
groups. Whereas all children in Group Three grew in their ability
to offer multiple ways of framing the problem, for example, only
one child in Group Five made gains. In each of the other three
groups, gains were moderate. A closer look at the narratives
generated for each group offers some possible explanation for these
differences.
Groups One and Four took the longest to complete their
dialogue. Because neither group could reach consensus in the end,
the researchers had to stop their conversations at the 25-minute
mark. In both of these groups, gains in children’s framing from
pre-to post-task interview were moderate, though for seemingly
different reasons. Group One, remember, was unable to come up
with a second super-ordinate frame after they resolved the fairness
issue. When they could not, the children settled into their respective positions, arguing for their personal preferences. It seems that
for this group, while children were exposed to a variety of frames,
none but fairness was compelling enough to hold their attention.
Group Four was also unable to reach consensus because they
could not resolve the issue of fairness. One group member insisted
that his idea (sunshade) was best despite his peers’ concern that
pre-K children deserved the money. Here, it seems, children were
not exposed to many frames, and so their growth from pre-to
post-were limited. Interestingly, in this group, only Curtis and
Rachel showed gains. David and Maggie, the two who were most
set in their positions from start to finish (David arguing for
sunshade throughout and Maggie arguing for pre-K throughout),
did not. Here, children’s openness to hear others’ ideas, it seems,
played a powerful role in whether they showed gains from pre-to
post-task interview.
Group Two also showed moderate gains. Though this group
considered a variety of frames and did ultimately reach consensus,
their conversation was relatively short (15 minutes), and so it
seems they had fewer opportunities to engage alternative frames
than their peers.
The group with the greatest amount of growth, Group
Three was the group that spent the longest amount of time
deliberating and who ultimately reached consensus. Not only
did children discuss the problem at length, considering a
number of analytic frames, but they also seemed willing to
listen to one another in a collective effort to make a decision
with which everyone would be happy. This is despite the fact
that members of the group brought with them the fewest
number of frames as they approached dialogue (four initial
frames, as with Group Five). Thus it seems that time and a
willingness to engage others’ ideas were facilitative conditions
for children’s learning.
The group with the least gains, Group Five, held the shortest
deliberation and reached consensus faster than any other group
(13 minutes). This brief conversation seemingly denied students
opportunities to thoughtfully consider a wide variety of analytic
frames.
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Table 4. Frames Discussed by Children (Pre-/Post-)
Student

Pre-

Post-

New Frames

Addie

2

2

0

Adam

4

4

0

Cody

4

5

1

Oliver

3

4

1

Group One

5 initial frames: fairness, self-interest, common good, kindness, tradition
Group Two
Dominic

2

4

2

Helen

3

3

0

Joshua

4

4

0

Taylor

2

3

1

6 initial frames: fairness, self-interest, common good, kindness, tradition,
safety
Group Three
Brittany

2

4

2

Caleb

3

4

1

Jacob

1

2

1

Maddy

2

3

1

4 initial frames: fairness, self-interest, common good, tradition
Group Four
Maggie

2

2

0

Curtis

2

4

2

David

3

3

0

Rachel

2

3

1

5 initial frames: fairness, self-interest, common good, kindness, tradition
Group Five
Anna

3

4

1

Daniel

3

3

0

Eddie

1

1

0

Paula

2

2

0

4 initial frames: fairness, self-interest, common good, safety

Perhaps not surprisingly, self-interest was the frame most
frequently mentioned by students during their pre-task interviews
(see table 5). Recall that Zhang and colleagues (2013) found that
American children were more likely to express egocentric concerns such as personal consequences for doing the “right” thing.
Despite self-interest being a common initial frame, however, it was
not offered by many children in the context of dialogue, only being
asserted eight times overall. That self-interest was a familiar frame
(at least as familiar as fairness and common good), and yet not
offered in dialogue suggests that children shared an understanding
that it would not resonate with their peers. Whether conscious or
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not, I cannot say. But children seemed to know not to advance a
self-interest position here. Was this because selfishness was
understood as a poor character trait? Addie’s pre-task interview
suggested this interpretation. She said, “I was trying to make a
decision about the preK equipment and the swing set . . . because I
really do want the preK to have equipment, but I don’t want to be
selfish; that is why I put this as my choice.” It could also be that
children’s previous experience taught them that asserting their own
preference would be insufficient to persuade others.
Fairness and common good were the second most frequently
discussed initial frames. This may explain why these two frames
were offered most often and seemed to resonate with children
more than the others. Unlike self-interest, these two frames were
frequently employed in discussion. It seems that children believed
these frames were worth putting on the table, perhaps because
teachers and others in the school context often discussed problems
and solutions using these frames.
Table 5. Children’s Initial Frames
Frame

No. of Children

Self-Interest

16

Common Good

14

Fairness

9

Tradition

4

Safety

3

Kindness

2

A closer look at children’s initial frames offers no compelling
finding about demographic patterns. Self-interest, common good,
fairness, and safety were frames brought by children of both
genders, all races, and both socio-economic identifiers. Tradition,
perhaps interestingly, was only raised as a frame by White children
(three boys and one girl). Kindness was raised only by two White
boys. Of course, given the small sample of children participating in
this exploratory study, I feel unable to make much of these specific
results, except to say that tradition and kindness were perhaps
frames less frequently encountered in the school setting.

Discussion
This exploratory study suggests that children do indeed think
deeply about problems, considering different concerns that they
believe should be taken into account, framing problems in a variety
of ways. They seem to also have a keen sense of which frames will
be the most persuasive in group dialogue. Though research
suggests that children often think about problems as a matter of
self-interest, data here suggest that they may refrain from asserting
their personal preferences when deliberating with their peers.
Instead, calling on fairness and common good as ways of reasoning
about the problem that are more likely to resonate across the group.
Children, it seems, are knowledgeable of cultural norms at play in
the school context. Whether children would call upon the same
analytic frames in different contexts is beyond the scope of this
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study. Finally, analysis of data here suggests that certain conditions
of peer dialogue may lead to greater gains in children’s ability to
invoke and move between multiple analytic frames. Children who
demonstrated a willingness and desire to engage others’ ideas were
more likely to show gains.3 Relatedly, children who spent time
working through the problem with their peers showed greater
gains. It seems safe to say that the greater number of initial frames
held by children in a group has the potential to facilitate greater
gains for participants, but, as I have shown, this condition is not
sufficient on its own. If children are unwilling to listen to one
another, get stuck on one frame, or move too quickly to consensus
without unpacking everyone’s ideas, children are less likely to
benefit from their peers’ rich thinking.
Existing research on the nature of children’s participation in
shared reasoning looks primarily at the type of rhetorical moves
and argumentative strategies children employ (Clarke, Resnick,
Rose, 2015). Evidence suggests that children’s engagement in
transactive discourse (particularly when other-oriented), for
instance, contributes to greater conceptual change and reasoning
ability (Chi, 2009; Teasley, 1997). We have also come to understand
that children appropriate various strategems, (such as prompting a
peer, citing evidence, and restating one’s position) over the course
of a given dialogue session (Anderson et al., 2001). To my knowledge, however, this is the first study of its kind to examine the
analytic frames children employ to make sense of problems, how
they make sense of competing frames in the context of deliberative
dialogue, and what they learn as a result. More research is certainly
needed to expound upon these preliminary findings. In what
follows, I offer some possible implications for teachers and
researchers based on this initial foray into children’s negotiation of
analytic frames.
Peer dialogue does indeed have the potential to be a powerful pedagogical space. Teachers committed to engaging dialogic
practice, however, may want to consider how to foster children’s
willingness to engage others’ ideas and how to provide ample
time for doing so in the context of the school day. Educators often
ask children to state their opinions and then to justify their
arguments. Rarely do we push them then to think through why
some arguments may strike us as better than others. And yet this
additional layer of engagement with one another’s thinking is
important. Not only can unpacking analytic frames (identifying
new frames, asking why some frames resonate and others do not
in particular contexts) perhaps make children more skilled
deliberators, it may also help them become more critical consumers of other people’s frames. Rojecki (2007), for example, reveals
frames used in media commentary to privilege the goals of a
movement opposed to teaching scientific evolution. Similarly,
Martin (2015) described how megachurch pastors promoted
fiscal conservatism following the 2008 financial crash, deploying
“language and arguments that emphasize American economic
providence and the need for individuals to take personal responsibility” (p. 39). In the media, in church, in a multitude of venues
in which citizens spend time, speakers and writers intentionally
frame arguments to persuade. They do so by calling on values and
norms we hold, maybe even subconsciously. A lack of awareness
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

of this intentional framing leaves individuals vulnerable to
persuasion and manipulation.
Relatedly, it seems children would benefit from an examination of the consequences of employing one frame over another.
Group One, which was unable to find a second super-ordinate
frame that resonated with everyone, ultimately resorted to
debating their own personal preferences. Drawing this scenario
out, one can imagine a community where citizens fail to identify
a single concern or goal that unites them. Without common
ground of this sort, their arguments fall upon deaf ears and they
are unable to reach consensus about a shared problem. Unfortunately, the consequence of this inability (or unwillingness) to find
common ground results in frustration with one another, a lack of
collective action, and—as is often the case—decisions made by
technical procedures that leave portions of the community
feeling unheard.
A number of intervention studies have shown that intentional
instruction about argumentation strategies lead to children’s
enhanced argumentation ability. But these focus mostly on
rhetorical strategies rather than on the difficult work at the
intersection of cognitive and moral reasoning—the negotiation of
value systems is tricky. This work does suggest, however, that
focused and intentional instruction about effective dialogue is
worthwhile. That is, once we have a clearer sense of what such
interventions should involve. Continued research into children’s
thinking and doing is necessary for making informed practical
recommendations. Much remains to be understood, for instance,
about the frames children use, how they come to know them, how
they understand their relative power in dialogue, and what they
learn from deliberation of them. The small-scale study described
here, I believe, raises interesting and important directions for this
work. We could better understand how context matters for
children’s analytic framing, if indeed it does. We could also better
understand how aware children are of the frames they use and why,
and what would come from more explicit talk about them. Finally,
larger, more diverse samples may help us to identify patterns
among children in the frames they employ.

Notes
1 My use of the work market here is in the simple sense of exchange, à la
Bourdieu (1991), and not in the traditional capitalistic economic sense,
as in Friedman et al.’s “free market” ideology.
2 This research program was generously supported by a grant from the
Spencer Foundation’s New Civics Initiative.
3 In previous work, we highlight the critical role that trust plays in
children’s willingness to engage collaboratively (James, Kobe, & Zhao,
2017).
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1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

What is the problem?
Which choice do you think is best? Why do you think that?
How strongly do you feel about your choice? Why?
How do you think others will feel about this problem?
What do you think others will choose? How do you
thinks others will respond to your idea?
How do you think the conversation will go? What makes
you think it will go this way?
As a group your goal is to come to an agreement. By the
end of your conversation do you think your group will
come to agreement? Why/why not?
As you go into this conversation, what are you going to
try to do?
What will you do if others disagree?
How are you feeling about having this conversation?
What do you hope will happen?

Appendix B: Post-Task Interview Protocol
1. How did you feel about the conversation you just had?
Why do you feel that way?
2. How did the conversation go? Did it go as you expected?
Explain.
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3. Did anything surprise you? What?
4. How did each member of your group think about the
problem?
5. Do you think the other people in your group wanted to
know what you thought? How do you know?
6. Do you think the other people in your thought your ideas
were important? What makes you think that?
7. Do you think others considered your ideas? How do you
know?
8. Did you want to know what the other people in your
group thought? Why?

democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

9. Did you think the ideas your group members shared were
important? Why? How did you show them their ideas
were important? Which ones were most important to
you?
10. Did you consider the ideas your group members shared?
Why? How did you show them you were considering
their ideas?
11. Did you learn anything about the topic? Did
you learn anything about having discussions?
Did you learn anything about any of your group
members?
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